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Abstract We report the results from a questionnaire-type experiment designed to
elicit whether individuals decide in accordance with the equity axiom constituent for
Rawls’s second principle. The experiment is sequential in nature. Hence it generates
panel data. We use recently developed panel data methods for studying the role that
state dependence and unobservable individual-specific effects play for the observed
equity judgements. The results indicate that a dominant share of our probants initially
adhere to Hammond’s equity axiom, but that many of these leave the Rawlsian position
at later stages of the experiment. Although state dependence plays a significant role
it cannot alone explain the observed decision behavior. Individual-specific effects are
also important.
1 Introduction
The Rawlsian school claims that welfare judgements should be based on how poli-
cies affect the utility of the worst-off individual in society. More specifically, welfare
judgements should be guided by the Rawlsian difference principle, which underlies the
maximin principle of Rawls (1971). Rather than contemplating this normative state-
ment, we turn in the present paper to the positive issue of whether individual decisions
are consistent with a specific version of the difference principle. Since economic theory
cannot provide an answer to this question, our examination will be empirical.
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Empirical examinations are inflicted with their own problems. In particular, actual
choices usually will be determined by a mixture of ethical and selfish considerations,
the constraints under which choices are made, and strategic considerations. Thus it
may be difficult to recover the underlying ethical principles from observed choices. A
number of economists have therefore turned to experiments as a method for eliciting
the principles that guide individuals when prioritizing on behalf of society.
We use an experimental setup developed by Gaertner (1992). Since probands are
sequentially exposed to different levels of a treatment variable, one should ask to what
degree choices made by probands at the later stages of our experiment are affected by
their earlier choices. This phenomenon has long been recognized as a basic human
response. In the (social) psychology literature this tendency to weight past choices
heavily in present decisions is referred to as “preference for consistency”. As argued
in Cialdini et al. (1995) it exists as a measurable personality trait.1 The trait manifests
itself in experimental data as what is called (positive) state dependence in economet-
rics. To capture the phenomenon we apply panel data methods described by Honoré and
Kyriazidou (2000) and Magnac (2000), who in turn build on the work of Chamberlain
(1985), and Heckman (1981). An important feature of the estimation technique pro-
posed by Chamberlain (1985) is that it allows state dependence to be examined inde-
pendently of individual-specific effects.
The present paper is related to the empirical literature that uses experiments in the
examination of equity judgements. Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) carried out one of the
first experiments aimed at revealing the principles that guide individuals who are given
the hypothetical task of allocating goods to others. After having examined nine dif-
ferent principles, including the Rawlsian maximin principle and Utilitarianism, they
concluded that people in experiments tended to act in accordance with the Rawlsian
maximin rule when taking decisions in situations involving “need”. In other situations,
however, they found that the maximin rule did not apply. Frohlich et al. (1987a, b)
found that the vast majority of participants preferred a compromise between the Rawl-
sian maximin principle and Utilitarianism, rather than one of these ”extreme” princi-
ples. In a third experiment, reported by Gaertner (1994), the results are again mixed
and difficult to understand as the outcome of one of the pure principles set out in the
literature.
Gaertner et al. (2001) summarize the findings in the line of research to which the
present paper belongs. They conclude that whether people base their welfare assess-
ments on the Rawlsian difference principle is both context-dependent and dependent
on the political and cultural environment. Gaertner (1992), Jungeilges and Theisen
(2005), and Jungeilges and Theisen (2008) arrive at similar conclusions. The context-
dependence is emphasized also in the review paper of Konow (2003).
Our current research effort makes use of the established experimental design due
to Gaertner (1992). We contribute, however, through addressing new research ques-
tions, and by exploiting data from an additional country. The examination of the
question “Do people act in accordance with the Rawlsian difference principle?” moti-
vated the strand of the empirical social choice literature cited above. It also stimulated
1 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this literature.
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our current effort. The results for Norway by and large confirm the findings of the
previous research. In the present paper, however, we investigate whether individual
decision behavior depends on the size of the group of individuals who are better off
no matter which social state is realized. While this question was only touched upon
in previous papers, we provide an in depth treatment of the issue. Finally, and most
important, we contribute through examining whether choices in the sequential exper-
iment are conditioned on previous choices, i.e., whether there is state dependence.
We do this by applying modern econometric methods. By considering explicitly the
dynamics involved in sequential experimental design, we carry the work of Jungeilges
and Theisen (2005) a substantial step forwards.
In Sect. 2, we provide a brief theoretical account of the social choice context moti-
vating the experiment. A discussion of the experimental design, and the instrument
used in the empirical examination is given in Sect. 3. The data collection procedure and
the sample are described in Sect. 4. The subsequent section contains results on indi-
viduals’ propensity to act in accordance with Rawls’ second principle, and an analysis
where decision trees are used for describing the sequential nature of our experiment.
In Sect. 6, we specify the econometric model used for examining and testing for the
presence of state dependence. The maximum likelihood estimator for the state depen-
dence parameter of a dynamic binary choice model in which the dependent variable is
lagged once is determined explicitly. Next, in Sect. 7, we present and discuss the esti-
mation results. In addition, we assess how well state dependence alone can replicate
our observations, and we discuss the extent to which the results are driven by individ-
ual-specific effects. Section 8 summarizes the main results and outlines some ideas
for further research.
2 Theoretical background
Let X = {x, y, . . .} represent a finite or infinite set of social states. The set N =
{1, 2, . . . , i, j, . . . , n} refers to a finite group of individuals. Suppose that X ≥ 3
and N ≥ 3. Next, define R as the set of orderings on the set of social states X . Then
for R ∈ R ∀ x, y ∈ X , we write x Ry to indicate that a social state (or policy) x is at
least as good as the state y from a collective point of view.
To reflect the evaluations of social states by individuals, consider the Cartesian
product of the set of individuals and the set of social states: X × N . Elements of this
set are of the form (x, i). Such pairs are interpreted as referring to person i under social
state x . Let U denote the set of bounded functions defined on X × N . Functions from
this set are used for welfare comparisons between individuals under a given social
state as well as between different individuals across alternative social states. Given
u ∈ U ∀ i, j ∈ N , and ∀ x, y ∈ X , the statement u(x, i) ≥ u(y, i) says that social state
x is at least as good as social state y from the point of view of individual i . To express
that under social state x individual i is at least as well off as individual j under social
state y, we write u(x, i) ≥ u(y, j). Social choice theory is concerned with finding
characterizations of social welfare functionals. That is, one tries to characterize the
type of functions which can be defined from the set U to the set of orderings R, given
some reasonable restrictions. Among the typical requirements such as independence
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of irrelevant alternatives, Pareto-type principles and the anonymity principle one finds
Hammond’s equity axiom
Axiom 1 For some u ∈ U and any x, y ∈ X , if for some pair of individuals i, j ∈ N
u(y, i) < u(x, i) < u(x, j) < u(y, j)
and for all k ∈ N \ {i, j} : u(y, k) = u(x, k), then x R y.
This axiom says that the individual who is better off anyway should not deter-
mine the social ordering. The relationship to Rawls’s second principle is apparent.
Deschamps and Gevers (1978) and Gaertner (1992) discuss the technical significance
as well as extentions of this important static axiom. The assumption of a stable utility
function made in this line of research is acceptable also when sequential choices are
made within a short span of time, and in a controlled experimental setting. We now turn
to the experimental design used to examine whether human decisions are consistent
with Axiom 1.
3 Experimental design
We address three research questions related to Hammond’s equity axiom.
1. Do individuals facing decision contexts as described in Sect. 2 decide in accor-
dance with Hammond’s equity axiom?
2. Does the decision behavior depend on the size (S) of the group of individuals who
are better off no matter which social state is realized?
3. Is the propensity to make a specific choice conditioned on previous choices, i.e.,
do we observe state dependence?
The first research question links this paper to the previous literature. Results con-
cerning items 2 and 3 may shed light on whether the axiom has enough structure to
be valid under widely different circumstances. The question is now what structure an
experiment should have to be informative about our three research questions. First of
all, we have to subject a proband to a situation which mimics the type of decision con-
text described in Sect. 2. Second, we consider a situational aspect which is not made
explicit in Hammond’s axiom: the size (S) of the group of those who are better off
irrespective of the social alternative. In the axiom the size S is fixed, but to address the
second research question the size (S) should be made an integral part of the decision
context, so that probands have to make decisions under different levels of S. Finally,
to answer the third research question we observe probands’ responses (decisions) to
a sequence of increasing levels of the S.
In response to these requirements we chose the following structure for the hypo-
thetical decision questions: In each situation, person i is better off under x than under
y, while person j (or a group) is better off under y than under x . The utility of person
j is always higher than the utility of person i irrespective of the social state chosen
(cf. Axiom 1 of Sect. 2). The proband has to choose between the alternatives x and
y. Each individual is sequentially subjected to the same choice situation with four
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increasing levels of the treatment variable S (size of the group of those who are better
off regardless of the alternative chosen): s0 < s1 < s2 < s3.
Our interest lies in the sequential decision pattern evolving under the systematic
variation of the factor S only. We use six different frames designed by Gaertner (1992),
cf. Table 1. The richness of situational detail was chosen on purpose. The resulting real
world flavor of the choice contexts was supposed to trigger the involvement of pro-
bands.The wide variation of detail between situations allows us to assess the robustness
of the results.
Let us use Situation 1 to give a concrete description of the format. In the base-
line question of Situation 1, probands are asked to decide whether a certain amount
of money should be allocated exclusively to the assistance of a handicapped person
(alternative x), or to alternative y, the education of one intelligent child (s0 = 1.) In
the second step, alternative x still is to allocate the money to the assistance of the
handicapped person, but the number of intelligent children that could get education
in alternative y is increased to two (s1 = 2). In the third and the fourth step, the num-
ber of intelligent children who would benefit from alternative y is increased to three
(s2 = 3) and four (s3 = 4), respectively. In other words, more and more individuals
who unanimously would prefer alternative y to x are gradually introduced, while the
number of individuals who would benefit from x is kept constant at one. The crucial
question is whether the number of individuals who would benefit from alternative y
will affect the allocation of money, when money either must be allocated exclusively
to x or exclusively to y.
In Situations 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the alternatives among which probands are asked
to prioritize differ from Situation 1. In Situation 2, probands are asked whether they
would allocate money to an aid program against hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa (x)
or to environmental protection programs in or close to the probands’ home country
(alternative y). In Situation 3, the issue at stake is whether a poor country should
allocate its limited reserves of foreign currency to the purchase of dialysis machines
(x) or to the purchase of fruit and vitamin pills (y) to selected parts of the population.
In Situation 4, the issue is whether a poor country should allocate foreign currency
to the purchase of dialysis machines (x) or to the import of Bordeaux wine (y). In
Situation 5, the question is whether a poor country should allocate foreign currency
to the purchase of clothing for a group of needy people (x) or to the import of Bor-
deaux wine (y). Finally, in Situation 6 the issue is whether a run-down country should
emphasize workers’ rights to strike and to choose occupation freely and pull itself up
by its bootstraps (x) or accept a condition to set aside workers’ basic rights in order
to obtain a favorable loan that would benefit significant groups of the population. A
pdf-file containing the questionnaire due to Gaertner (1992) can be found at http://
www.vwl-theorie.uni-osnabrueck.de/Basic.pdf. For a hard copy, see Jungeilges and
Theisen (2008).
All situations are designed so that there will be unanimous support for the claim
that alternative x is a social goal worth pursuing. In Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6, the
same is likely to hold for alternative y. Situations 4 and 5, however, were deliberately
designed so that some may consider alternative y not to be warranted as a social goal.
This was done in order to test the logic and consistency of probands’ answers across
situations and to test for context dependence of choices.
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Table 1 Summary of situations
Sit. Fund Alternative x Alternative y (treatment S)
1 Unspecified amount 1 disabled Individual
trained to master basic
tasks
Improve language and
science skills of
(o) 1 gifted child
(a) 2 gifted children
(b) 3 gifted children
(c) 4 gifted children
2 Central bank profit Food aid to Sub-Sahara Africa Environmental projects to
(o) improve ecological
conditions in the coastal
area
(a) and reduce air
pollution of coal-fired
power plants
(b) and clean rivers program
(c) and reduce noise along
highways
3 Exchange reserve Purchase dialysis equipment Purchase vitamins and
fruit to upgrade diets of
(o) pregnant women
(a) and infants
(b) and teenagers
(c) and workers doing
hard physical labor
4 Exchange reserve Purchase dialysis equipment Import of wine affordable for
(o) well-off citizens
(a) and less well-to-do citizens
(b) and even less prosperous
(c) and even less prosperous
5 Exchange reserve Import cheap textiles to
benefit the needy
Import of wine affordable for
(o) well-off citizens
(a) and less well-to-do citizens
(b) and even less prosperous
(c) and even less prosperous
6 Conditional reconstruction
loan
Grant right to strike and
freedom of occupational
choice to benefit the
country’s workers
Eliminate right to strike
and freedom of
occupational choice to
benefit
(o) employees of large enterprises
(a) and self-employed
with small or
medium-sized
businesses
(b) and civil servants
(c) and retired persons
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4 Data collection
The data were collected in March 2001, using two different student groups at the
University of Agder located on the Southern coast of Norway. Group 1 consists of
first-year students in a two-year study program in basic business administration. The
second group consists of third-year students in an advanced two-year program in
business administration.
Descriptions of the six situations together with answering sheets were adminis-
tered during normal lecture hours. It was pointed out to the students that there was
no such thing as a single right answer to a question. The first-year students had not
been exposed to welfare theory or social choice theory prior to the experiment. The
third-year students, by contrast, had been introduced to the concepts of utilitarian and
Rawlsian welfare functions. Discussions with the students after the answering sheets
had been collected revealed that at least some of the third-year students had figured
out that the experiment was related to welfare economic issues and the concepts of
Rawlsianism and Utilitarianism.
In total, the sample consists of 130 probands of which 66 were first-year students
and 64 were third-year students. There was an equal split between males and females.
Probands’ age ranged from 19 to 40, but 95% of them were between 19 and 25 years
old. As pointed out in Jungeilges and Theisen (2005) the sample is not too far from
being representative of the Norwegian population when it comes to social background.
5 Data analysis
For each situation, a sequence of four decisions, indexed by t ∈ {0, . . . , 3}, constitute
the response of a proband. At each step in the sequence there is a binary choice: The
decision can be in favor of the individual(s) who is (are) worst off under both policies,
in which case it is in accordance with the equity axiom. Alternatively the decision
can be in favor of those who are best off under both policies, which means that the
decision follows a non-Rawlsian logic. The results of the experiment can be displayed
by means of decision trees, one for each situation, as shown in Figs. 1 and 2. Each
node in these trees represents a step in the sequence of four decisions—indicated by
(0), (1), (2), (3) at the top of each subfigure. At each node, the upper branch represents
a decision in accordance with the equity axiom, and the lower branch represents a
decision that is not in accordance with the Rawlsian logic.
Let us use Fig. 1a for explaining the sequential nature of the experiment. The upper
branch of the tree (branch zero from the top) represents a sequence of decisions that
follows the Rawlsian logic at each and every step of the sequence. The number 0.8692
on the first leg of this branch is the relative frequency of making a Rawlsian decision
at the first step. Similarly, the number 0.7611 on the second leg of the branch is the
relative frequency of a Rawlsian decision at the second step, conditional on a Rawl-
sian decision in the baseline question. In the same manner, the numbers 0.8023 and
0.9275 on the third and fourth leg of the upper branch are the relative frequencies
of making Rawlsian decisions at steps number three and four, conditional on having
made a Rawlsian decision at the previous steps. The leaf frequency 0.4923 at the end
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1 Empirical decision trees. a Decision tree for Situation 1. b Decision tree for Situation 2. c Decision
tree for Situation 3. d Decision tree for Situation 4
of the branch is the frequency of deciding in accordance with the Rawlsian logic at all
steps. Hence, the leaf frequency is the product of the frequencies on all the legs that
make up the branch. Notice that the leaf frequencies of branch zero are large in all the
six situations, indicating a strong tendency to decide in accordance with Hammond’s
axiom throughout the experiment.
123
State dependence in sequential equity judgements 105
(a) (b)
Fig. 2 Empirical decision trees. a Decision tree for Situation 5. b Decision tree for Situation 6
Branch number 1 in Fig. 1a represents a sequence where the proband in the baseline
question (t = 0) decides in accordance with the equity axiom, sticks to the Rawlsian
position at steps 1 and 2 as the group of individuals that would benefit from policy y
is increased, but with a conditional frequency of 0.0725 deviates from the Rawlsian
position at step 3. Similarly, branch 3 represents a sequence where the proband at steps
0 and 1 follows the Rawlsian logic, but with a frequency of 0.1977 leaves the Rawlsian
position at step 2, and with a frequency of 0.9412 sticks to the non-Rawlsian position
also at step 3.
Let us now summarize the main features of the choices in all six situations
(cf. Figs. 1, 2). Starting at the root of the trees, observe first the high frequencies
with which the individual in the baseline question chooses in accordance with the
equity axiom. Second, having initially made a Rawlsian decision, the frequencies are
high that the decision is replicated at later steps. The frequencies of deviating from the
initial Rawlsian decision are, however, in Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6, also sizable, while
this is not the case in Situations 4 and 5. Third, the frequencies of initially making a
non-Rawlsian decision are moderate in Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6, but having made such
a decision at the first step there is a strong tendency to stick to the same decision at
the later steps.
The observations summarized so far indicate that the results for Situations 4 and 5
differ from the others. In both situations, the frequency of initially choosing in accor-
dance with the equity axiom is close to 1, and once having made a Rawlsian choice at
the initial step, very few deviate from this decision at later steps. Hence, in Situations
4 and 5, we find a high relative frequency of support for the worst-off individual(s),
for any level of the treatment variable. In Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6, by contrast, the
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fraction of probands that at all steps showed support for those who are worst-off is
substantially lower and fairly stable between 40 and 50%, cf. the leaf frequencies of
the very upper branches.
Notice that the leaf frequencies that a proband will follow branches 1, 3, or 7 in
Figs. 1 and 2 are much smaller than the leaf frequency of branch zero. Relatively small
frequencies are also associated with the very lower branch (15), which represents a
complete sequence of non-Rawlsian decisions. Finally, observe the very small leaf
frequencies of branches 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 to 14. This large collection of branches con-
tains two subsets. The first category consists of the eight branches 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10,
11, and 13, where the individual switches back and forth between deciding in accor-
dance with the equity axiom and not adhering to the axiom. Such decision patterns
are difficult to rationalize, and may indicate that the individual has not understood
the logic of the experiment. In the second category, consisting of the three branches
8, 12, and 14, the individual at an early step does not decide in accordance with the
equity axiom, but at a later step does adhere to that axiom. Such decision patterns
seem peculiar. Throughout the rest of the paper we will refer to the decisions corre-
sponding to all the branches 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 through 14 as inconsistent. The fact that
all the branches corresponding to sequences that are classified as inconsistent carry
very small leaf frequencies indicates that probands largely must have understood the
logic of the experiment. Moreover, one may speculate that the low frequency of incon-
sistent decisions simply may be due to errors in decision making. When it comes to
fulfillment of the equity axiom, the branches representing inconsistent decisions are
not of primary interest. On the other hand, when testing for state dependence, we shall
see that the some inconsistent branches carry decisive information. If an inconsistent
decision is made at an early stage and the individual continues to stick to that decision,
it may be indicative of state dependence.
The descriptive analysis so far shows that decision behavior is quite similar across
contexts, in particular for Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6. For all situations, our results confirm
earlier findings that a considerable fraction of probands decide in line with Axiom 1
(cf. research question 1). In the sequel of this section, we will compare the responses
in the six situations under two different perspectives. First, we address the second
research question by focussing on the change in the probability of a decision adhering
to the equity axiom as the level of the treatment variable increases, i.e., as the group of
individuals who are better off under both alternatives is extended. Second, the distri-
bution of three types of decisions will be scrutinized: decisions that are consistent and
in line with the equity axiom, those that are consistent but do not follow the axiom,
and finally inconsistent decisions. In each case, we aggregate information contained in
the decision trees to reduce the complexity of the evidence. We seek a clearer view of
whether there is a common decision pattern across the different contexts. Apart from
that, both views are in some way related to state dependence. The graphs associated
with the first perspective can be thought of as an informal way to assess the possibility
that state dependence may play a significant role. The second perspective produces
an overview of the results for all situations. In addition, it provides prior information
concerning the existence of the state dependence estimator derived in Sect. 6.
The evidence on changes in the frequency of adherence to the equity axiom is for
Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6 summarized in Fig. 3. Each subfigure is associated with one
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Fig. 3 Fulfillment of the equity axiom [N = 130]
of these decision contexts, and contains a plot of the relative frequency of a decision
fulfilling the equity axiom against the level of our treatment variable, i.e., the size of
the group of those who are better off under both alternatives. For the baseline question
(t = 0) the (unconditional) relative frequency can be read off the first leg of branch 0
of the decision tree. The frequency at step t ∈ {1, 2, 3} is computed as the product of
the first t + 1 (conditional) frequencies found on branch 0 of the decision tree for the
respective situation. Each observed frequency is indicated by •. In addition, we super-
impose a plot of hypothetical probabilities based on the assumption that a proband,
once (s)he decided in line with the axiom at step 0, lets a random process (independent
identically distributed Bernoulli trials B(p = 0.5)) determine her or his subsequent
choices. Each hypothetical probability is indicated by the symbol ◦. Finally, we add a
horizontal line extending to the right of the baseline frequency of choosing according
to the Rawlsian logic.
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Fig. 4 Situations 1–6 in (Pˆr , Pˆu )-space, [N = 130]
The graph of the relative frequencies indicated by • shows the effect of a variation
in the treatment variable on the judgements of probands. The hypothetical probabili-
ties indicated by ◦ show how the evidence should look like if probands did not take
the information on group size into consideration (or they considered it but it did not
influence their choice at all) and there was no state dependence. The horizontal line
also relates to a hypothetical scenario: If probands who adhere to the equity axiom
in the baseline decision continue to do so on each and every later step, despite the
information on the increase in the magnitude of the treatment variable (group size),
then the observed frequencies for steps 1 to 3 would lie on this line. Such a pattern
would indicate a ”preference for consistency”.
As indicated by Fig. 3, the fraction of the respondents adhering to the equity axiom
is a decreasing function of the magnitude of the treatment variable. The fraction adher-
ing to the axiom drops from about 90% at the lowest level of the treatment variable
to slightly less than 50% for the highest level of the treatment variable. In all four
situations the graph of observed frequencies is distinctly different from the graph for
the hypothetical probabilities. Although there are some differences between the four
graphs, we conclude that proband’s behavior seems to be driven by systematic factors
that operate in a similar way in Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6. At this stage of the analysis it
is unclear whether state dependence and/or individual specific effects can explain our
observations.
Next, let us consider the distribution of three types of decisions previously intro-
duced: consistent decisions in line with the equity axiom, consistent decisions not
following the axiom, and inconsistent decisions. Figure 4 gives this distribution for
all situations. The frequency of deciding in accordance with the equity axiom is mea-
sured on the horizontal axis in Fig. 4. The probability of either initially or eventually
deciding in a non-Rawlsian way is measured on the vertical axis. Finally, the esti-
mated probability of not deciding according to any of these patterns is measured by the
vertical or horizontal distance from the point representing a situation to the hypotenuse
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of the equilateral triangle. This distance reflects the frequency for the occurrence of
what we have characterized as inconsistent decisions. Notice that our probands were
most likely to decide inconsistently in Situations 2 and 3. In the other situations very
few decisions were inconsistent. The crucial role of the inconsistent decisions will
become apparent when we test for state dependence in Sect. 7.
The descriptive analysis of this section indicates strong similarities in the decision
pattern across contexts, in particular this is the case for Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6. In
these situations we have seen that the majority of the respondents reveal themselves as
either Rawlsians (40–50%) or non-Rawlsians (10–20%). The majority of the remain-
ing probands eventually respond to an increase of the treatment variable by leaving
the Rawlsian position.
Our experiment generates panel data. For that data structure Heckman (1981) pro-
vides an extensive discussion of the different kinds of forces that may be at work. Two
phenomena are particularly relevant in our context: Individual heterogeneity, and true
state dependence. On the basis of the analysis in the present section it is not possible
to say which of these two forces are driving the observed outcomes.2 In the sequel,
we will therefore turn to research question 3 by making use of a model of sequential
decisions that allows for state dependence as well as for individual effects.
6 The econometric model
We now turn to a dynamic binary response model which relates the conditional prob-
ability for a success in period t to state dependence (γ ) and unobservable individual
effects (δi ). In our context, the choice of individual i at time t, yit , is defined as a
success if it is in line with the Rawlsian logic (yit = 1). The dynamic binary response
model with the dependent variable lagged once takes the form
P(yi t = 1 | δi , yi 0, . . . , yi t−1) = e
γ yi t−1+δi
1 + eγ yi t−1+δi , (1)
where i = 1, . . . , N indexes individuals and t = 1, . . . , T serves as a time index. In
our case T equals 3. We assume γ ∈ IR. For individual i the probability for a success
occurring in the initial period is assumed to depend on the unobservable individual-
specific effect δi ∈ IR alone
P(yi 0 = 1 | δi ) = p0(δi ).
This model reflects how data are generated in the experiments discussed in the
previous sections. Following an approach due to Chamberlain (1985) which is out-
2 Using a standard logit model, Jungeilges and Theisen (2005) find that there is a form of time dependence
also for the choice made at the first step. Specifically, the probability that this choice is in accordance with
the Rawlsian logic depends on the following covariates: age, gender, parental background, job experience,
and educational level reached. These covariates can be interpreted as capturing a proband’s “history” up to
the point in time when the experiment was carried out. This finding is very much in line with the pattern
observed for the decision trees suggesting that the choice in the initial stage and the decisions taken at later
stages are related.
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Table 2 Outcomes relevant for estimation of γˆ . A = A1 ∪ A2 and B = B1 ∪ B2
lined in Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) and Jungeilges and Theisen (2006), it can be
shown that inference about the state dependence parameter, γ , in the case where the
data generating process is observed at exactly four points in time, can be based on the
log-likelihood function
L(γ ) =
N∑
i=1
χyi1+yi2=1(yi1, yi2) ln
(
eγ (yi0−yi3)yi1
1 + eγ (yi0−yi3)
)
. (2)
The argument of the ln function is the probability that an individual will follow a
particular branch in our decision trees, conditional on the choice made at the first step
of the experiment, while χ is an indicator function taking the value 1 if the condition
yi1 + yi2 = 1 holds, otherwise it is equal to zero. The χ function selects the subset of
individuals who either at time 1 or time 2, but not at both times, have made a Rawlsian
choice. The log likelihood function (2) is independent of individual-specific effects δi .
Since the maximum likelihood estimator of γ does not depend on the unobservable
individual-specific effects, we can obtain an estimate of γ without having to make
any distributional assumptions about the unobservable δi . This desirable property is a
consequence of the selection made by the indicator function χ in (2). For the rationale
behind the selection rule see Chamberlain (1985). In our case the indicator function
selects the subsets of outcomes (yi0 yi1 yi2 yi3) from A = A1 ∪ A2 and B = B1 ∪ B2
given in Table 2.
Once the likelihood function for the appropriate subsample has been established,
the maximum likelihood estimator of the state dependence parameter is found in the
standard way. From the first order condition it follows that
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γˆ = ln
(
n2 + n6
n3 + n5
)
. (3)
Involving the second order derivative of (2) w.r.t. γ , Jungeilges and Theisen (2006)
show that (3) indeed maximizes the likelihood function.
Notice that four of the events which are contained in the set A ∪ B, and therefore
were included in the log likelihood function, have dropped out in the course of deriving
the maximum likelihood estimator. This is due to the fact that the probabilities of these
events are independent of the state dependence parameter. Hence they are constants
that vanish when finding the first order derivative of the likelihood function.
Next, notice that the estimator of the state dependence parameter is obtained by
applying the natural logarithm to a ratio of counts based on a subsample of individuals.
The numerator of this ratio is the count of cases in which just one state change occurs,
conditional on the initial choice. The denominator is the count of cases in which the
maximum number of (three) state changes are made, conditional on the initial choice.
Consequently, the value of the estimator is positive (negative) if the number of sample
outcomes in which one state change occurs is larger (smaller) than the number of
incidences with three state changes. Positive values of γˆ reflect state dependence in
the sense that the probability of realizing a success in period t is high if a success has
been observed in period t − 1. If, on the other hand, γˆ assumes a negative value, it
indicates state dependence of the type where there is a tendency that individuals switch
back and forth between following the Rawlsian logic and not adhering to that logic.
Finally, if the ratio of the absolute frequencies of cases with only one state change
and cases with three changes is approximately equal to one, the γ estimator will take
a value close to zero. In the context of model (1) the probability for a success after
a success had been observed before would then just be determined by the individual
specific effect δi .
From (3) it is immediately seen that the maximum likelihood estimator of γ is not
defined if a sample does not contain admissible cases with exactly one state change
(n2 + n6 = 0) or one does not observe any binary sequences indicating three state
changes (n3 + n5 = 0). From a formal point of view the estimator then does not exist.
In cases with many elementary events and small samples this problem may often arise,
since outcomes that occur with a probability close to zero may not be observed in the
sample. Through increasing the sample size sufficiently, the problem may be solved.
Although increasing the sample size certainly will be a sound strategy, there is no
guarantee that the problem will always vanish with a sample that can realistically be
collected. Moreover, to obtain a larger sample may be costly. The obstacles and costs
of obtaining a sample of sufficient size may in particular be high for samples generated
through experiments. Consequently, we need a procedure to come around the problem
that γˆ does not exist, without needing to collect ever-larger real-world samples.
Such a procedure can be designed once it is recognized that the outcomes needed to
estimate γˆ occur with a zero frequency in the observed sample. In the true underlying
population distribution that the sample can be thought as drawn from, however, it is
reasonable to assume that these events have strictly positive, albeit small, probabili-
ties for occurring. On this assumption we can model the underlying true population
distribution by means of the following mixed density
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φ(α) = αφ(ω) + (1 − α) fˆ (ω)
where fˆ (ω) is the density estimate obtained from our sample, φ(ω) represents a den-
sity of our choice where ω is a random variable defined over the set of 16 outcomes,
and α ∈ (0, 1). By assigning a sufficiently small value to the mixing constant α, the
density φ represents a marginally distorted summary of our sample. We choose α
such that φ(α) is contained in a “confidence region” around the true but unknown
underlying discrete density function f (ω). In what follows, we set α = 0.05. The key
criterion for the choice of φ is given by the need to put some positive probability mass
over the outcomes which are associated with 0 probability in the empirical density fˆ .
In our case, we specify φ(ω) as a uniform density. Each outcome is assumed to occur
with equal probability of 116 .
We generate data from the mixed cumulative distribution function 	(α) on the
basis of 	−1, the inverse of the distribution function. Once we have generated such
a pseudo sample—with the number of observations identical to the number of obser-
vations in the original sample—we test the hypothesis H0 : φ(α) = f (ω) versus
H1 : φ(α) = f (ω) using a χ2 test for the equality of to multinomial distributions
described by Mood et al. (1974, pp. 448–452). The χ2 statistic and the associated p
value can be interpreted as a measure of the distance between the empirical densi-
ties φˆ and fˆ . If we fail to reject the H0, we can view the pseudo sample as a set of
realizations drawn from a density being equivalent to the population density f . Such
an equivalent sample is then used to estimate the state dependence parameter γ . If
the estimator does not exist, a new pseudo sample is drawn. The process terminates
once, we have obtained γˆ . The likelihood of at least one repetition of the sampling
process is inversely related to the size of α. In our implementation of the procedure
with α = 0.05, we observed the necessity of very few repetitions.
7 Inference
We estimated the state dependence parameter γ for Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6. The esti-
mates for Situations 2 and 3 were obtained from the collected sample of size N = 130,
while for the remaining situations the resampling procedure described in the last sec-
tion had to be implemented.3 The estimation results are shown in Table 3, along with
the count of observations in the numerator and denominator of the ratio under the ln
function in the γ -estimator (3), the likelihood ratio (LR) for testing the hypotheses
H0 : γ = 0 versus H1 : γ = 0 and the associated p values.
The hypothesis H0 : γ = 0 is clearly rejected at the 5% level on the basis of the
likelihood ratio statistic for all situations. Hence, we conclude that the results provide
clear evidence for state dependence of the type where the likelihood of a success in
3 As discussed above, to obtain a numerical measure of state dependence that is independent of the indi-
vidual specific effects, inconsistent responses which do not seem to follow the logic of the equity principle
or any other principle of distributive justice are essential. Such outcomes are not observed for Situations
1 and 6, a fact that can already be seen from Fig. 4. There, the distance of Situations 2 and 3 from the
hypothenuse is not negligible since the fraction of inconsistent observations is positive. For Situations 1
and 6 the small distance from the hypothenuse indicates the lack of inconsistent observations.
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Table 3 Inference about γ (N = 130)
Situation n2 + n6 n3 + n5 γˆ LR p Value
1 11 1 2.40 9.75 0.0018
2 14 3 1.54 7.72 0.0055
3 21 1 3.04 22.36 0.0000
6 20 2 2.03 17.10 0.0000
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Fig. 5 Kernel density estimates for γˆ . a Situation 1 (mean = 2.44, median = 2.56). b Situation 2
(mean = 1.42, median = 1.39). c Situation 3 (mean = 2.39, median = 2.35). d Situation 6 (mean = 2.78,
median = 2.89)
period t is high if a success was realized also in period t − 1. Finally, notice that the
estimates of the state dependence parameter vary moderately between situations, and
that the estimates based on resampling do not differ strongly from the estimates for
Situations 2 and 3.
In order to obtain an even better basis for assessing the γ -estimates, we have for
each of the Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6 generated 500 new samples, using the resam-
pling procedure described at the end of Sect. 6. All these generated data sets fulfill
the restrictions for the existence of the γ -estimator, and provide us with estimates of
the state dependence parameter. Kernel density estimates based on the realizations
γˆ1 . . . γˆ500 for each situation are given in Fig. 5. For each situation the average and
the median of the 500 γ estimates are close to the point estimates given in column 4
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of Table 3.4 Moreover, the generated γ -estimates are all positive. This lends support
to our previous statements concerning state dependence.
For each Situation 1, 2, 3, and 6 we construct a hypothetical decision tree based on
the values of γˆ given in Table 3. It is assumed that no individual effects are operating
(δi = 0). According to (1), the probability for arriving at a choice in line with the
equity axiom at step t , conditional on the choice made at t − 1, can then be stated as
Pˆ (yi t = 1 | δi = 0, yi 0, . . . , yi t−1) = e
γˆ yi t−1
1 + eγˆ yi t−1 , (4)
where we take the relative frequency for the initial choice as it is observed in the
experiment. The individual specific effect cannot be removed from the probability
estimate of the initial choice. The conditional probabilities computed from (4) are put
on the branches of the decision tree. Apart from the dependence on the initial choice,
the resulting tree depends on the state dependence estimator only. Hence, we call it
a γˆ -tree. The γˆ -trees are shown in Fig. 6. Each tree provides (i) an estimate for the
distribution of the logically possible outcomes of the experiment (leaf probabilities)
and (ii) it gives an insight into the process by which this distribution is generated,
i.e., via the probabilities on the branches for the hypothetical case with no individual
specific effects operating once the initial decision has been made.
Let us contrast the distribution obtained under the hypothesis of no individual spe-
cific effects with the estimate of the distribution based on the entire sample evidence.
For this purpose we compute the differences between the conditional branch frequen-
cies based on all observations (shown on the decision trees in Figs. 1 and 2) and the
probabilities found in the corresponding γˆ -trees

t = Pˆ(yi t = ξ | δi ∈ IR, yi 0, . . . , yi t−1)
−Pˆ(yi t = ξ | δi = 0, yi 0, . . . , yi t−1), ξ ∈ {0, 1}. (5)
The tree constructed by positioning the differences between the conditional proba-
bilities on the associated branches and attaching the differences in leaf probabilities
to the leafs is referred to as a 
-tree. Notice that the 
-tree is only an expositional
device, not a proper decision tree. The 
-trees for Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6 are shown
in Fig. 7. A positive (negative) value in the 
-tree suggests that the probability is
underestimated (overestimated) by the model that ignores individual specific effects.
The larger the absolute values of the observed differences, the stronger the role of
individual specific effects.
If probands’ choices conditional on the choice made at step 1 are determined only
by state dependence, the γˆ -trees should be identical to the observed decision trees in
4 Let γˆl denote the ML estimate for situation l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 6} and γ¯ (500)l and σ (500)l represent the arithmetic
average and the standard deviation of the 500 estimates generated for situation l. To reflect the close-
ness between the point estimator and the estimate based on resampling we define the distance measure
dl = |γˆl−γ¯
(500)
l |
σ
(500)
l
. We find the values d1 = 0.0861, d2 = 0.1946, d3 = 1.1931, and d6 = 1.6516 for our
four situations.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6 γˆ -trees. a Situation 1. b Situation 2. c Situation 3. d Situation 6
Sect. 5, and the 
-trees should have zeros on all legs and leaves. Figure 7 clearly shows
that this is not the case. Hence, it seems that the unobservable individual effects must
play a significant role. The sum of the squared leaf-numbers in each subfigure a–d
provides an aggregate measure of how well the leaf-probabilities in the γˆ -trees can
be predicted from the estimated state dependence parameters, on the assumption that
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 7 
-trees. a Situation 1. b Situation 2. c Situation 3. d Situation 6
unobserved individual-specific effects play a role only at the first step of the experi-
ment. This measure shows that the predictive properties of the estimated γ values are
much better for Situation 2 than for Situations 1, 3, and 6. Focusing on the differences
shown for the leafs of the 
-tree we find a pronounced tendency to underestimate the
prevalence of outcomes in which individuals reconsider their initial Rawlsian choice.
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For several of these branches, the numbers on the legs and leaves of the 
-trees are of
substantial magnitude, in particular for Situations 1, 3, and 6. Strong individual effects
seem to be operating here, working in the direction of revision of initial choices.
From the 
-trees we observe that a model based on state dependence alone will
tend to overestimate the probability for events which were classified as inconsistent.
Individual factors seem to operate in the direction of keeping probands away from
responding to the experiment by choice sequences that are hard to explain by a Rawl-
sian or a utilitarian logic. Moreover, for individuals who at the initial step made a
non-Rawlsian decision, the model relying on state dependence only predicts choices
in subsequent decisions fairly well. Those probands are not likely to revise their initial
choice.
To summarize, we obtained statistically significant positive estimates of the state
dependence parameters for all four situations considered. State dependence clearly
plays a role. On the other hand, individual-specific effects are also important. The
substantial role played by individual-specific effects warrants the conclusion that indi-
viduals do not seem to stick to more or less ”automatic” patterns of responding to our
experiment. The fact that the decision trees for Situations 4 and 5 in Sect. 5 differ
strongly from the trees representing the other situations points in the same direction.
8 Conclusion
We have investigated three research issues. To begin with, we asked whether indi-
viduals act in accordance with Hammond’s equity axiom—irrespective of situational
detail. The results show that, in decision contexts that come close to real-world Sit-
uations (1, 2, 3, and 6), between 40 and 50% of the probands always decide in line
with the axiom, while between 10 and 20% never decide to the benefit of the worst-off
individuals. In accordance with earlier research findings there is considerable, but not
unconditional, support for Hammond’s equity axiom.
The second research question focuses on the individual’s decision behavior as the
level of the treatment variable is increased. We observe a clear pattern in our results for
the real-world Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6 (cf. Fig. 3). Although 75–90% initially decided
in accordance with the equity axiom, between 25 and 35% left their initial Rawlsian
position as the the size of the group of those who are better off was increased. To
conclude, although the adherence to Hammond’s equity axiom is initially substantial,
the larger the group of those who are better off irrespective of the policy chosen, the
smaller is the propensity to act in accordance with the equity axiom.
The third research problem asked whether our results are driven by state depen-
dence. The fact that a large share of the probands stick to their initial decisions through-
out the experiment may be due to state dependence, but it may also be due to individual
specific effects. To clarify the question, we first obtain an estimate of the state depen-
dence parameter in a dynamic binary response model. The estimator is independent
of the unobservable individual-specific effects. Then the null hypothesis of no state
dependence is tested against the simple alternative of (any type of) state dependence
using a likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis is clearly rejected in Situations 1, 2,
3, and 6. All the estimated state dependence parameters are positive, indicating that
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the results are—at least to some degree—driven by state dependence. In other words:
Once an individual has made a choice (Rawlsian or non-Rawlsian) there is a tendency
that it will stick to that decision.
The part of the systematic choice behavior in our experiment that cannot be
explained by state dependence, is due to unobserved individual-specific effects. In
the 
-trees in Fig. 7, large leaf numbers indicate that the individual effects play a sub-
stantial role for some choices. It seems that unobservable individual-specific effects
are important for explaining why a large group of individuals adhere to the equity
axiom throughout the experiment, in particular in Situations 1, 3, and 6. Moreover, the
individual effects seem to explain much of the propensity to leave the initial Rawlsian
position as the level of the treatment variable is increased.
To make inference about state dependence that is not distorted by the presence
of unobservable individual-specific effects, it is important that our data contain also
some “inconsistent” choices. Nevertheless, the large majority of probands decided
consistently throughout the experiment. Notice also that when presented with peculiar
decision contexts (Situations 4 and 5), decisions differ markedly from what we found
in realistic situations. These results strongly indicate that probands understood the
logic of the experiment and responded in a rational manner. Furthermore, the striking
difference between the decision behavior in the real-world Situations (1, 2, 3, and 6),
and the more peculiar situations (4 and 5), indicate that decision behavior is context
dependent. At the same time, the similarity of the results for Situations 1, 2, 3, and
6 suggests that the main results are robust with respect to changes in the decision
context. Jungeilges and Theisen (2005) provide a more extensive analysis of context
dependence.
At the present state we have not tested whether our results are robust to changes in
the starting point. In the context of empirical distributive justice Lars Schwettmann
has recently confronted probands with an alternative sequence of levels of the treat-
ment variable in the case we refer to as Situation 3. Relative to the natural increas-
ing sequence of levels of the treatment variable, he reports small and statistically
insignificant differences in responses.5 One of the areas where researchers, for many
years, have payed attention to starting point bias (anchoring) is contingent valuation.
Herriges and Shogren (1996) find that starting point bias may occur in sequential pref-
erence elicitation processes, but also that this is not necessarily the case. Moreover,
Aprahamian et al. (2007) find that individuals are heterogenous. For some they find
evidence of starting point bias, for others they fail to establish it. It is unclear whether
and under what conditions starting-point bias plays an important role. An empirical
investigation of the seriousness of the starting point bias in our context suggests itself
as a subject for future research. We believe that our approach to estimating the state
dependence parameter might be useful in clarifying also this question. To implement
such an approach we will have to set up a new experiment to generate new data.
Another interesting issue for future research would be to exploit data from differ-
ent countries to examine whether our results on state dependence are robust towards
changes in culture. Finally, alternative designs of the experiment, e.g., systematic var-
5 These results have not been published. They were communicated verbally to one of the authors by Lars
Schwettmann (Martin-Luther-University, Halle-Wittenberg).
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iation of selected aspects of our situations, could be developed to isolate factors which
influence individual decision behavior in distributive dilemmata.
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